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A Scathing Critique Of The FBI
By Reed Irvine and Cliff Kincaid
April 23, 2002
Judge William Webster’s recently released report on internal security programs at the FBI is a scathing critique. It was commissioned by Attorney General John Ashcroft after the discovery of the 22-year career of treason by FBI Special Agent Robert Hanssen. The magnitude of Hanssen’s treachery was stunning and left many wondering just how he could have gone undetected for so long. Webster’s report answers that question: there was no internal security to speak of at the FBI.
The Webster report is familiar reading for those acquainted with the disastrous neglect of security during the Clinton administration. The report is a litany of security lapses, vulnerabilities, and bad practices in what is supposed to be the nation’s premier law enforcement, counterespionage and counter terrorism agency. Webster and his panel found an institutional bias against security and a lack of sufficient resources, personnel and management attention, all of which began in the mid-1990s.
Webster found that there were practically no controls on highly sensitive classified documents and that computer systems were absurdly vulnerable to the "insider threat." FBI agents with access to classified intelligence information were not required to take polygraphs. There is not even a Bureau-wide definition of what constitutes a security violation. No wonder Hanssen was able to give the Russians so much classified information and compromise so many human intelligence sources and intelligence collection programs.
The FBI failed to heed any of the "lessons learned" from other espionage scandals. For example, in 1995 in the wake of the CIA Aldrich Ames case, a new requirement was imposed on the entire intelligence community — annual financial disclosure reports. For years, Ames had conspicuously lived beyond his known means. Since most Americans spy for money, security experts believe that more scrutiny of the finances of intelligence officers could alert them to potential spies. The Bureau ignored the financial disclosure order and still doesn’t require agents to file annually. Hanssen has said that with a little scrutiny, the Bureau could have easily detected that he was living well above his means.
The Webster report is reminiscent of a similar report on security failures within another cabinet department – the Department of Energy. Just two years ago, the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board issued a scathing report on security practices at Energy and its nuclear weapons labs after the Chinese espionage scandal. Same institutional bias against security, same neglect of security during the Clinton years, same catastrophic results, and same resistance to mandated reforms.
Both reports come out at about the same place: given the potential horrific consequences "the political structure is duty bound" to fix these problems. But there are no cheap, quick fixes and the risk is that, just as with the Energy Department, when the news cycle moves on, the Bureau will fall back into its old habits.
(Reed Irvine can be reached at ri@aim.org)
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